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L 
CHAPTER 4 
Contracts 
J. EDWARD COLLINS 
§4.1. Teaching contract: Entitlement to salary upon resignation. 
In 1916 the Supreme Judicial Court handed down a decision in a case 
involving a schoolteacher who died during the summer vacation after 
she had completed her teaching for the academic year. Her salary was 
payable monthly and the payment for the last month of the year had 
not become due at the time of her death. In denying the right of 
her executrix to recover for the balance of the salary accruing during 
the vacation period, the Court regarded the contract as entire and sub-
ject to an implied condition that she should be living and physically 
able to work during the full term of the contract, even though the 
complete consideration had been furnished by her in less than the 
twelve-month period: prior to her death. This decision in Donelan 
v. City of Boston1 has been criticized by Williston2 as being unsound, 
a criticism that has been echoed by the Courts of Appeal for the Second 
and Third Circuits,S as well as by legislation4 and administrative regu-
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§4.1. 1223 Mass. 285, III N.E. 718 (1916). 
23 Williston, Contracts §838 (rev. ed. 1936): "There was no express condition 
qualifying the city's promise, and as the teacher had substantially fulfilled her con-
tract, there was no failure of consideration. There can be no doubt that ten 
month's teaching was the essential if not the sole exchange of twelve monthly pay-
ments. The decision in effect allows the city to receive services without full pay-
ment for them." 
3 In re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc. 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940); In re Public Ledger. 
Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947). In each case the bankruptcy of an employer was 
involved. Employees under a union contract were entitled to vacations with pay. 
the extent of the vacation being based upon the individual employee's length of 
service. Vacation pay was regarded as additional wages, the consideration for it 
furnished by the year's service, only the time of its receipt being postponed. Such 
vacation pay constitutes a valid expense of administration in bankruptcy. 
4 In 1928, G.L., c. 29, §31, was amended to provide that the annual salary of any 
teacher employed by the state "whose regular service is rendered from September first 
to June thirtieth, shall be for his service for the number of weeks established by the 
department [of education] for such school to be in session during such period, 
payable, however, in equal installments on the first day of each month, and the 
amount earned and unpaid at the time of his resignation, retirement, death or 
1
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lationsG designed to prevent, in Massachusetts, a reoccurrence of the 
result had in the Donelan case. 
During the 1960 SURVEY year a variation of the Donelan problem was 
presented in Ohrenberger v. City of Boston.6 The plaintiff occupied 
the position of associate director of physical education in the city's 
schools. Pursuant to his employment contract his vacation period had 
been designated as running from July 6 through August 30, 1954. On 
July 12 he was elected by the school committee to be assistant superin-
tendent of schools. He accepted this position on the following day, 
thereupon undertaking the duties of his new position. In an action 
to recover the unpaid but allegedly earned balance of his salary as 
associate director for the period July 13 through August 30, represent-
ing his vacation pay, he was unsuccessful in both the trial court and 
the Supreme Judicial Court, it being found that his case did not fit 
within the corrective provisions of the school committee regulations 
since he did not fail to complete the school year because of "death, 
resignation, retirement, marriage or discharge." In reaching its con-
clusion the Court adverted to the Donelan case and the criticism leveled 
against it, but found it inapplicable, and therefore left undecided 
whether it would now be followed. 
The decision in the Ohrenberger case presents great difficulties. A 
question may be raised as to the soundness of the Court's conclusion 
that the school committee regulations were not controlling. By them, 
upon resignation, the employee is entitled to have his salary propor-
tioned on the basis of one-tenth of the actual salary for each school 
month in service. On precedent,7 acceptance by him of the position 
of assistant superintendent effected an implied resignation of his posi-
tion as associate director of physical education, but, says the Court, 
such implied resignation is not a resignation within the meaning of 
that word as used in the regulations since the regulations contemplate 
injury or leave of absence shall be paid forthwith to the persons entitled thereto." 
Acts of 1928, c. 183, §l. By subsequent amendment, Acts of 1932, c. 127, §2, ad-
vances of pay may be made in advance of the teacher's regular vacation to the ex-
tent of the pay to which he will become entitled during such vacation period. 
II Section 331.1 of the Rules and Regulations of the School Committee of the 
City of Boston provides: "Teachers, [and] members of the supervising staff ... 
whose compensation is established at a fixed rate per annum, and who do not 
complete the school year because of death, resignation, retirement, marriage or dis-
charge, shall be entitled to that proportion of their salary for the last school year, 
which shall be obtained by allowing one tenth of the annual salary for the school 
year for each school month in the service the last school year ... " 
6 340 Mass. 22, 162 N.E.2d 774 (1959). 
7 Commonwealth v. Hawkes, 123 Mass. 525 (1878). This case involved a police 
court justice who, while active as .such, was elected to the state House of Repre-
sentatives, in which position he sat while also continuing to act as a justice. Upon 
information brought by the Attorney General it was held that he could not law-
fully occupy the two positions simultaneously. Upon acceptance of the elective 
position he impliedly resigned from his position as a justice, no assent or concur-
rence to the resignation by a superior authority being necessary. By statute, G.L., 
c. 30, §21, a person is inhibited from receiving at the same time more than one 
salary from the treasury of the Commonwealth. 
2
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an employee's severance from the school system, something that did 
not occur here. This would appear to be an unduly narrow reading 
of the regulations. If, as the Court suggests, the regulations were un-
doubtedly adopted to overcome the effect of the Donelan case, they 
should be read to accomplish that purpose rather than to thwart it. 
The language making the regulation applicable to teachers and super-
visory staff employees "who do not complete the school year because 
of ... resignation" would undoubtedly have covered Ohrenberger 
if he had expressly resigned his then position to accept the higher one. 
In other words, it appears that the purport of the regulations is to 
cover an employee who does not complete his contract during the 
school year because of his resignation from the position covered by the 
contract. If this interpretation is a correct one it is difficult to see 
why the same result should not be achieved in the case of an implied 
resignation as well as in that of an expressed resignation. 
Although the Court does not specifically state that the regulations are 
to be strictly construed because in derogation of the common law as 
enunciated in the Donelan case, this appears to be uppermost in the 
Court's thinking. Such a judicial attitude in the construction of legis-
lation has been deprecated, and properly so, by legal philosophers.S 
It is similarly deplorable in the construction of administrative regula-
tions. 
But even if it should be assumed that the Court's conclusion that the 
regulations do not cover the Ohrenberger situation is a correct conclu-
sion, the fact that the regulations might be inapplicable hardly resolves 
the problem unless the Court is basing its decision upon the Donelan 
case, something it purports not to do. It appears inescapable that the 
Court is repeating its earlier error to require now, not only that the 
employee must live during the contract period of his vacation but also 
must occupy the contract position during that period. For the second 
time the Court has blinded itself to the fact that the employer in both 
the Donelan case and the Ohrenberger case has received the full benefit 
of the employment contract for which he is required to pay only a 
fraction of the contract price. If such was acceptable doctrine in 1916, 
83 Pound, Jurisprudence, c. 18, §lll, Relation of the Imperative to the Tradi-
tional Element (1959). "The proposition that statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law are to be construed strictly has no analytical or philosophical justification. 
It assumes that legislation is something to be deprecated. As no statute of any 
consequence dealing with any relation of private law, unless declaratory, can be 
anything but in derogation of the common law, under this doctrine the social 
worker and the legal reformer must always face the situation that the legislative 
act which represents the fruits of their labors will find no sympathy in those who 
apply it, will be construed narrowly, and will be made to achieve as little as pos-
sible" Id. at 664. "Not only must we reject the doctrine of strict construction of 
legislation in derogation of the common law, but we must come to regard legisla-
tion on matters of legal significance (as English writers put it, 'lawyer's law') as part 
of the law so that where a policy is shown at variance with that received at com· 
mon law, the policy may be resorted to in analogous cases in order to choose a 
starting point for judicial reasoning when choice has to be made between start-
ing points of equal authority." Id. at 669-670. 
3
Collins: Chapter 4: Contracts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1960
48 1960 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §4.2 
as a matter of employment contract law, it cannot today be regarded 
as anything but an antediluvian throwback. 
§4.2. Teaching contract: Tenure. A second decision involving a 
teacher, troublesome to a teacher called upon to criticize judicial opin-
ions, is that of Rhine v. International Y.M.C.A. College.1 In a state-
ment of faculty personnel policy given to all teaching appointees of the 
college, it is enunciated that after three years of service faculty members 
might assume they have permanence of tenure provided their work is 
satisfactory, subject to modification in the event of (1) a change in edu-
cational policy involving the teaching subject or department discon-
tinuance or (2) a serious .financial crisis requiring drastic budget re-
construction. The first three years of teaching service is probationary, 
reappointment notice to be given not later than March 15th of each 
contract year. The plaintiff, an assistant professor, taught at the col-
lege under three successive one-year contracts, being notified in Feb-
ruary of his third teaching year that he would not be reappointed be-
cause of curtailment owing to reduced enrollment and an impending 
curriculum reorganization. However, in June, the college, through its 
president, offered him a one-year contract under the condition that it 
should be a terminal appointment with no commitment beyond the 
academic year. The contract was accepted by the teacher. Thereafter 
becoming dissatisfied, he sought an adjustment of his position through 
various procedural steps in the college. Being unsuccessful, he brought 
action for breach of contract, apparently contending that the tender, 
in June, of the terminal contract for the fourth year constituted a 
breach of his third-year contract. In holding for the defendant the 
Supreme Judicial Court rightly concluded that the status of the teacher 
during the first three years was probationary, without tenure, and with 
no right to reappointment. Upon his acceptance of the fourth year 
terminal contract he was bound by its terms, including the terminal 
provisions. 
The difficulty with the decision is not in these conclusions but in the 
implications of the case. In fact, for the period of his first three years, 
the college by its policy statement could be said to have led the teacher 
to believe that at the end of his third year, if the college desired to em-
ploy him thereafter, it would do so only' under a contract giving him 
tenure. As the Court correctly states: "It [the policy statement] cer-
tainly implies no commitment for continuance of employment, if for 
any reason the experimental relationship leads to the conclusion that 
a more extended relationship may be unsatisfactory." But does it not 
imply a commitment that if his employment is continued beyond the 
third-year period it will be on a tenure basis? And is this commitment 
not a part of his first three contracts, the failure to comply with which 
constitutes a breach thereof? 
Of course, there is no doubt but that the teacher may, as a matter of 
basic contract law, waive any right he may have to receive a tenure con-
§4.2. 1339 Mass. 610,162 N.E.2d 56 (1959). 
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tract and that this waiver may be accomplished by the subsequent exe-
cution of a no-tenure contract. But does not the holding of this case 
suggest that the college may, by the annual proffer of a new terminal 
contract and its subsequent execution by the teacher (traditionally in a 
poor bargaining position), completely stultify the provisions of its pol-
icy statement over an indefinite period of years? 
This is an area in which there appears to be a dearth of cases.2 It is 
somewhat unfortunate that the Court did not more clearly spell out 
the contract rights of the teacher adversely affected by the execution of 
the fourth-year contract. It is to be hoped that as a precedent the 
holding of this decision will not be extended beyond the narrow limits 
of its facts. 
§4.3. Restitution: Tender of performance. It is hornbook law that 
when a contract calls for simultaneous performance by both parties, in 
order for the plaintiff to recover for the defendant's breach he must 
allege and prove that he tendered performance, or stood ready, able, 
and willing to do so, and further that the defendant failed to perform 
upon demand. In Bruni v. Andre,l the same requirements were called 
for although the only legal relief available was not for breach of con· 
tract but for restitution for benefits conferred by the plaintiffs and 
received by the defendants under an oral contract for the purchase and 
sale of land unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds. 
Pursuant to an oral agreement the defendants obligated themselves 
to convey land to the plaintiffs for a stated sum of money when the title 
• to the land should be cleared of possible defects. In reliance upon the 
agreement the plaintiffs made certain improvements to the land, and 
although thereafter the title was cleared the defendants failed to convey 
the property. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendants' 
motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. 
The immediate obstacle to the plaintiffs' recovery for breach of con-
tract was the Statute of Frauds pleaded by the defendants. This proved 
to be insurmountable, the Court properly refusing to give weight to 
the plaintiffs' contention that the contract was taken out from under 
the Statute by part performance, this contention being recognized with 
respect of land contracts only in equity and not at law.2 The plaintiffs 
2 Any criticism of the opinion filed in this case must be tempered by the recog· 
nition that counsel for the plaintiff was of little or no assistance to the Court in 
resolving the legal issues presented as evident by the plaintiff-appellant's brief, 
which shows a total citation of one case and that one to support a contention that 
the determination as to whether the terminal appointment constituted an accord 
and satisfaction or a release was a matter for the jury. 
§4.3. 1339 Mass. 708, 162 N.E.2d 52 (1959). 
2 There is some question whether specific performance will be granted upon an 
oral contract for the sale of land at the instance of the buyer who has paid the full 
purchase price. In Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, 28 Am. Rep. 418 (1869), it is 
stated that the part performance must be such as to create an estoppel against the 
plea of the Statute of Frauds in order for the oral contract to be enforceable in 
equity. This principle is reiterated in Andrews v. Charon, 289 Mass. I, 193 N.E. 
737 (1935). 
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were not thereby foreclosed from legal relief, however, since the Court 
read the pleadings to assert a right to recover for expenditures incurred 
under the contract. The language of the opinion, in dealing with this 
point, is unfortunately not free from ambiguity. At one point the 
rights of the plaintiffs at law are stated to be confined to recovery for 
expenditures, while at another point reference is made to the defend-
ants' benefits as an alternative to the plaintiffs' expenditures as a meas-
ure of recovery.3 
Having determined, however, that the plaintiffs could maintain an 
action at law for quasi-contractual relief, the Court then proceeded to 
require that they establish their contract rights and the defendants' 
contract obligations in precisely the same way as though the action were 
being maintained for breach of the contract. There being no evidence 
from which to conclude that the defendants were obligated to notify 
the plaintiffs when title to the property was clear and, further, no evi-
dence of the plaintiffs' ability to perform or of their tender of per-
formance, and no evidence of defendants' unwillingness to perform, the 
plaintiffs failed to establish a cause of action. 
Since the defendants apparently did not raise the question of the 
Statute of Frauds until after the action was brought, it might be in-
ferred from the decision that tender of performance by the plaintiffs 
would have been excused if the defendants had earlier asserted that 
they had no enforceable contractual obligations. Why any distinction 
should be made between a situation wherein the Statute of Frauds was 
raised by a nonperforming defendant prior to suit, in which instance 
it would appear that the plaintiff would be excused from both tender-
ing performance and making demand for the defendant's performance, 
and a case wherein the Statute is raised for the first time in the litiga-
tion is difficult to see, as long as recovery is not based upon breach of 
contract but restitution. It is quite apparent now that the defendants 
3 Frequently the loss suffered and the benefit received are co-extensive. When 
not, the innocent recipient of the benefit is generally liable to the extent of the value 
of the benefit received or the loss suffered, whichever is the lesser. Restatement of 
Restitution §42. However, when the benefit conferred is received on the basis of a 
bargain between the parties, there is authority to the effect that the defendant is 
obligated to pay the plaintiff for the detriment he has suffered. 2 Restatement 
of Contracts §355(1) and Comment a. See, in this connection, Cave v. Osborne, 193 
Mass. 482, 79 N.E. 794 (1907). Apparently holding to the contrary that even in 
such a situation recovery is limited to the value of the benefit conferred is Petition 
of Rosen, 236 Mass. 321, 128 N.E. 413 (1920). 
The difficulty in permitting recovery for detriment suffered when the perform-
ance is had under a contract unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds is 
commented upon by Corbin: "If the facts are such as to make the recognized remedy 
of reasonable compensation for benefits received an inadequate remedy, the courts 
are free to adopt this suggestion [that the Statute of Frauds should not prevent re-
covery of expenditures in reliance on the oral contract, even though the defendant 
was in no way "enriched" by them] as they formerly were to grant restitution to 
prevent unjust enrichment. It would merely be an additional step toward the 
complete nullification of the statute. Surely, an action for damages so computed 
is an 'action whereby to charge' the defendant upon his express promise." 2 Corbin. 
Contracts §422. p. 459 (1950). 
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do not intend to perform because under the Statute of Frauds the con-
tract is unenforceable. In this posture of the case should it not be suf-
ficient for the plaintiffs' recovery on a quasi-contractual basis to show 
the bargained-for benefits conferred on the defendant which have not 
been and otherwise will not be compensated for? 
§4.4. Illegality: Performance in violation of statute. A contract 
may be illegal for any of a number of possible reasons. The considera-
tion may be illegal. The contemplated performance may be illegal. 
Or illegality may even taint the contract in a situation in which the 
performance of the promised act is not, apart from the promise, unlaw-
ful, but the promise to do the act makes it such.1 
The case of Bucella v. Schuster2 involved the problem of the right 
to recover under a contract tainted with illegality, in that the perform-
ance was had in a manner violative of a statute, although performance 
in such manner was not required by the agreement. The plaintiff 
sought to recover for labor performed and equipment rented pursuant 
to a contract for the blasting of a ledge on the defendant's land. By 
statute,3 a city blasting permit had to be secured by the person using 
the explosives, the applicant for the permit being required to post a 
surety bond in an amount fixed by the issuing officer (in no event to 
exceed ten thousand dollars), to cover the risk of damage from the blast-
ing operation. The plaintiff failed to secure either the bond or permit. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover, his conduct being regarded as not so repugnant to public policy 
as to preclude recovery for his services and equipment rental expenses. 
The Court rested its decision upon the opinion of Holmes in the case 
of Fox v. Rogers.4 In that case a lawful contract was made to lay a 
drain. By statute drain pipes were required to be made of cast iron. 
Those installed by the plaintiff were of earthenware. There was also 
some question as to whether the plaintiff did not open up a portion of 
the street in violation of city ordinances in laying the pipe. Mr. Justice 
Holmes did not concern himself with the statute and ordinance but 
concluded that the contract was lawful since it did not contemplate 
unlawful performance, there being no illegality in either promise or 
consideration. Beyond this he suggested that even if the contract had 
contemplated the specific items, the installation of which would have 
been violative of the statute, the plaintiff might still have been able 
to recover. This is not one of Holmes' better opinions.5 
In the subsequent decision of Tocci v. Lembo,6 an attempt was made 
to put the Fox opinion back on the track by suggesting that the statu-
§4.4. 12 Restatement of Contracts §512. Comment e in this section points out 
that there is no impropriety in law in refraining from competition with another 
to an extent beyond that which could legally be promised. 
2340 Mass. 323, 164 N.E.2d 141 (1960). 
3 C.L., c. 148, §lOA. 
4171 Mass. 546, 50 N.E. 1041 (1898). 
5 See criticism of the language of the opinion in 6 Williston, Contracts §1761 
(rev. ed. 1938). 
6 325 Mass. 707, 92 N.E.2d 254 (1950). 
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tory violation in that case was only incidental to the performance of the 
contract and raised but a doubtful question of public policy.7 It seems 
to be on this basis that the Bucella case was decided. 
In cases involving this problem, the statute requiring the license or 
permit should be carefully examined to see what was sought to be ac-
complished thereby. The purpose of the requirement of the permit 
here was quite apparent - to guarantee, by the accompanying bond, 
that those who might be injured by the blasting operation would have 
some assurance of compensation for any claims they might have. The 
statute says nothing about competency in handling explosives as being 
a condition to the issuance of the permit. 
The statute does not, as it might have done, provide that contracts 
made or performed in violation of it, would be unenforceable at the 
instance of the violator.8 Is the absence of such a provision significant? 
In other Massachusetts cases involving the right of unlicensed persons 
to recover on contracts involving their unlicensed services, recovery 
has been denied to an attorney,9 an insurance broker,lO and a wholesale 
liquor dealer.H On the other hand recovery has been permitted by 
one acting as a real estate broker12 and by a person doing the work of 
a plumber.13 
A proper analysis in this type of case should be made to determine 
whether the purpose of the statute requiring the license or permit was 
designed to protect the public health, welfare, or morality against fraud 
or incompetence. If so, the Court would be on firm ground in refusing 
to recognize enforceable contract rights in an unlicensed person. On 
the other hand, to cite just one example, if the statute was designed to 
raise revenue, no such result could be justified. This approach might 
be more fruitful than any test based upon the seriousness of the illegal-
ity, or whether the illegal act constituted more than an incidental part 
of performance, or whether the illegal act was so excessively repugnant 
'j 325 Mass. at 709, 92 N.E.2d at 255. It also pointed out that the opinion could 
be supported on the failure of the defendant to plead illegality. The opinion in 
the Bucella case rejects this latter proposition. A reading of the Fox decision raises 
a question as to whether this summary rejection is justified. 
8 As an example of a statute so providing see Acts of 1957, c. 762, §2; now G.L., 
c. 112, §87RR. 
The fire prevention statute does provide that violators of the fire prevention 
regulations dealing with the illegal use of explosives may be proceeded against in 
equity by the Commonwealth, a city, or town, and may be sued in tort by anyone 
injured by an explosion of an explosive kept or transported by the violator con· 
trary to the provisions of the statute or regulations. G.L., c. 148, §§21, 22. 
9 Ames v. Gilman, 10 Metc. 239 (Mass. 1845); Browne v. Phelps, 211 Mass. 376. 
97 N.E. 762 (1912). 
10 Pratt v. Burdon, 168 Mass. 596, 47 N.E. 419 (1897). 
11 Brady v. Hardina, 216 Mass. 44, 102 N.E. 935 (1913). 
12 Pope v. Beals, 108 Mass. 561 (1871). 
13 Berriere v. Depatie, 219 MasS. 33, 106 N.E. 572 (1914). See criticism of this 
case on basis of the Court's distinction between one holding himself out as a 
plumber and one doing plumbing work under the contract in 6 Corbin, Contracts 
§1512 n.ll (1951). 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1960 [1960], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1960/iss1/7
§4.5 CONTRACTS 53 
to public policy as to preclude recovery for either the contract price or 
the value of the services performed. 
§4.5. Damages: Willful and unintentional deviations. The reme-
dies of a contractor seeking to recover against an owner for work per-
formed, whether on a contractual or quasi-contractual basis, are fre-
quently to be determined by whether he has fully or substantially 
completed the construction in accordance with the terms of the con-
tract. When the failure of complete performance is due to the willful 
and deliberate fault of the contractor, the Massachusetts courts have 
been traditionally strict in denying liability. Thus, in Bowen v. Kim-
ball,l decided in 1909, recovery of an unpaid balance in excess of $9000 
was denied a contractor whose willful deviations on a $96,500 building 
amounted in value to $800. Replacement of the nonconforming plas-
tering would have cost about $7000. 
The strictness of this approach has been criticized as effecting a 
penalty or forfeiture, "the extent of the penalty being in inverse pro-
portion to the size of the breach." 2 It has, however, been noted that 
some of the more recent cases in this state have softened the application 
of the doctrine slightly,S although they have not repudiated it in any 
way. 
During the 1960 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court decided 
Lantz v. Chandler,4 where the contractor's deviations were not inten-
tional but the cost of correcting them was substantial. Involved were 
the defendants' requested instructions to the effect that for the con-
tractor to recover for substantial performance his deviations must be 
immaterial, justified, or excused. The denial of the requested instruc-
tion was upheld, the Court stating that when the deviation is uninten-
tional, recovery may be had even though the deviation is more than 
immaterial or de minimis, as long as it is less than a substantial non-
conformance with the contract. 
§4.5. 1203 Mass. 364,89 N.E. 542, 133 Am. St. Rep. 302 (1909). 
23A Corbin, Contracts §707 p. 331 (1960). See also criticism of the Massachu-
setts doctrine in 3 Williston, Contracts §843 n.4 (rev. ed., 1936). 
S Morello v. Levakis, 293 Mass. 450, 200 N.E. 271 (1936), and Zarthar v. Saliba, 
282 Mass. 558, 185 N.E. 367 (1933), are noted in 3A Corbin Contracts §707 (1960), as 
instances in which recovery was permitted despite the contractor's furnishing of 
substituted materials, he believing the substituted product to be superior to that 
specified, and it being in fact suitable and satisfactory. The same result was had 
when the deviations were comparatively unimportant or easily remedied and fully 
compensable by a price reduction. 
Within the past ten years the strict rule was affirmed in Ficara v. Belleau, 331 
Mass. 80, 117 N.E.2d 287 (1954), a case involving a willful abandonment of the job 
by the contractor who left an unfinished building. Here the owner sued the con-
tractor. Because of the contractor's willful default he was barred in his cross action 
for breach of contract, but he was permitted to have the assessed damages reduced 
by the amount of the price unpaid by the owner. The Court responded to the 
criticism of Williston (see note 2 supra) by refusing to permit the owner to recover, 
against the intentionally defaulting contractor, damages measured by the cost of 
making the structure conform, thereby repudiating Glazer v. Schwartz, 276 Mass. 54, 
176 N.E. 613 (1938). 
4340 Mass. 348, 164 N.E.2d 153 (1960). 
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The holding is consistent with previous Massachusetts cases, as well 
as the general common law,1I and would not be particularly worthy of 
comment except for the fact that the Court again recognizes that any-
thing greater than immaterial or de minimis intentional deviations will 
bar the contractor from recovering for substantial performance, citing 
Bowen v. Kimball to that effect. 
§4.6. Third party beneficiary: Materialman's recovery upon con-
tractor's bond. During the last hundred years, Massachusetts has con-
sistently adhered to the rule that a third party for whose benefit a con-
tract was made cannot maintain an action thereon even though he 
should be described specifically in the instrument as an intended bene-
ficiary.I Judicial exceptions to the rule have been carved out in cases 
in which the promisor received assets that in equity belonged to the 
beneficiary,2 in which the promisee and beneficiary were blood rela-
tions,a in which the litigating parties were a lessor and a lease-assignee 
in possession,4 and in other situations based upon "subtle interpreta-
tion" of the existing rule and its exceptions.1i 
The problem has arisen from time to time when materialmen have 
sought to recover on bonds given by contractors to owners, which bonds 
have been conditioned upon the payment of project materialmen and 
laborers_ There being no privity of contract between the materialmen 
and the surety, recovery has been denied,6 except in situations in which 
the Supreme Judicial Court construed the materialman's reliance upon 
the bond as an acceptance of an offer of a separate unilateral contract 
made by the surety under the bond language.7 
During the 1960 SURVEY year there was presented to the Court, in 
the case of Waite Hardware Co. v. Ardini &- PIau, Inc.,s the question 
of whether an unpaid materialman who supplied a subcontractor on a 
highway construction project for the Massachusetts Turnpike Author-
ity had any standing to proceed in equity against the prime contractor 
and his surety, and to receive payment from a payment bond executed 
1\ I Restatement of Contracts §§174, 175. 
§4.6. I See 4 Corbin, Contracts §826 (1951). 
2 Clare v. Hatch, 180 Mass. 194,63 N.E. 250 (1902). 
a Gardner v. Dennison, 217 Mass. 492, 105 N.E. 359, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) ll08 (1914). 
468 Beacon Street, Inc. v. Sollier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935). 
114 Corbin, Contracts §826 (1951). 
6 Rockport Granite Co. v. Plum Island Beach Co., 248 Mass. 290, 142 N.E. 834 
(1924); Central Supply Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 273 Mass. 139, 173 N.E. 
697 (1930). 
7 In Johnson-Foster Co. v. D'Amore Construction Co., 314 Mass. 416, 50 N.E.2d 
89, 148 A.L.R. 353 (1943), the bond provided that it was "also made for the use 
and benefit of all persons ... who may furnish any material or perform any labor 
for and on account of said contract ... and they ... are hereby made obligees 
hereunder the same as if their own proper respective names were written here-
under as such, and they and/or each of them may proceed or sue hereon." The un-
named materialmen were found to have entered into an unilateral contract by 
selling material to the contractor in reliance upon the promise of the surety con-
tained in the bond. 
s 339 Mass. 634, 162 N.E.2d 13 (1959). 
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by them, the bond running to the authority as obligee, and being con-
ditioned upon payment of all laborers and materialmen involved in 
the prosecution of the work. Demurrers interposed by the authority, 
the prime contractor, and surety were sustained. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court affirmed. 
The opinion pointed out that the bond was not covered by the stat-
ute setting out the requirements of a performance bond on a construc-
tion contract with the Commonwealth or a municipality; the authority, 
although a public instrumentality performing an essential governmen-
tal function, is not the Commonwealth, and its contracts are not made 
on behalf of the Commonwealth. Therefore the statutory provisions 
for payment of materialmen out of statutory payment bonds were in-
applicable.lI Regarded as a common law bond, stated the Court, the 
contract contained no provisions constituting an offer running to the 
materialmen.1o The Court refused to imply such an offer from the fact 
that the usual purpose of a payment bond is to insure the payment of 
materialmen, especially in public works contracts in which the property 
cannot be subject to mechanics' liens. This position was taken despite 
the recognition that there appeared to be no other reason for the bond 
in this case,H and further despite the fact that in the case of similar 
bonds under municipal or state contracts protection is given the ma-
terialmen by virtue of the statutes. 
This seems to be a hard doctrine, although consistent with the Massa-
chusetts rule denying rights of recovery to third party beneficiaries. 
It is unfortunate that the Court was not able to come up with some 
"subtle interpretation" characteristic of some previous Massachusetts 
decisions in this field, because the materialman here seems to be neither 
fish nor fowl. He does not have the mechanics' lien rights available 
to the supplier on a private construction job; neither does he have the 
statutory protection under a bond available on a state or municipal 
project. Undoubtedly the legislation creating the statutory rights in 
the latter situation was intended to cover all public contracts not sub-
ject to a lien. It has now been remedied by an amendment extending 
the statutory protection to this type of case.12 In the meantime, the 
best that can be said for the materialman here is that he was unfortu-
nately ahead of his time and his plight may have been instrumental in 
the enactment of the corrective legislation. 
9 G.L., c. 149, §29. Although amendments in 1955 (Acts of 1955, c. 702, §2) require 
a statutory payment bond in such a construction project, the amendments did not 
become operative until after the execution of the bond in this case. 
10 The materialman's contention of reliance, upon which the case of Johnson-
Foster Co. v. D'Amore Construction Co., 314 Mass. 416, 50 N.E.2d 89 (1943), com-
mented on in note 7 supra, rested, was therefore rejected, there being no offer upon 
which reliance could be placed. 
11 This may be contrasted with the position taken by the Supreme Court of 
Alabama in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Rainer, 220 Ala. 262, 125 So. 55, 77 A.L.R. 13 
(1929). 
12 See note 9 supra. 
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